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CIVIL RIGHTS: A CALL FOR QUALIFIED
LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY FOR CITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Abstract: If a city council member engages in legislative conduct that violates a person's
clearly established, federally protected rights, should the council member ever be person-
ally liable for civil damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983? By the end of the 1980s, eight circuit
courts of appeals found that absolute legislative immunity prevented local legislators from
being held personally liable for their legislative acts. This majority position is misguided.
Legal analysis and public policy support qualified, rather than absolute, legislative immu-
nity for city council members in section 1983 cases. Under a rule of qualified legislative
immunity, the council member would be liable for legislative conduct that a reasonable
person would recognize as violative of the victim's clearly established, federally protected
right.
Assume that a city council member helps pass an ordinance that
violates a person's clearly established constitutional right. Consider,
for example, a zoning ordinance that is unconstitutional because it
amounts to a taking of a person's property for reasons not in the pub-
lic interest.' Assume further that a reasonable person in the council
member's position would have known that the ordinance would be
unconstitutional. Does federal law authorize the victim in such a sce-
nario to recover civil damages against the individual council member?
The answer depends on the correct interpretation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.2
Section 1983 provides that any person can be held civilly liable for
violating another's federally protected civil rights when the offending
party acts "under the color of state law."3 The United States Supreme
Court has stated that Congress intended the statute to provide a rem-
edy to parties deprived of constitutional rights by an official's abuse of
position.4
1. This is a common scenario in federal court. See, eg., Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th
Cir. 1980); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980); see also infra
notes 61-76 and accompanying text (discussing Bruce and Gorman Towers).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of
any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
3. Id. (emphasis added).
4. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (referring to the previous codification of section
1983, Revised Statutes § 1979), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social
Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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Despite the statute's broad language, suing state and local officials is
difficult under section 1983 because the Supreme Court has found that
the statute does not abrogate well established common-law principles
of official immunity.' Under the common-law "official immunity"
doctrine, certain types of official conduct are either "absolutely" or
"qualifiedly" immune to civil liability. 6 "Absolute immunity" com-
pletely bars damage suits against protected officials in their personal
capacities.7 "Qualified immunity" protects officials from personal lia-
bility only if they act reasonably.'
In section 1983 cases, the Supreme Court has adopted the common
law absolute immunity of judges,9 prosecutors,' ° and state" and
regional 2 legislators. Qualified immunity to section 1983, on the
other hand, protects executive officials, 13 and the administrative duties
of public officials in general. 14
Given that state and regional legislators have absolute legislative
immunity, two remaining issues are whether city council members
have any section 1983 immunity when engaged in legislative functions,
and if so, what kind? Over the course of the 1980s, the majority of
circuit courts of appeals held that, based on Supreme Court precedent
and policy considerations, local legislators are absolutely immune to
suits brought under section 1983.15 This Comment, however, dis-
agrees with the circuit courts' analyses.
5. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980); see, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1951). Section 1983 does, however, amend traditional common law. See
sources cited infra note 22.
6. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 132, at 1056-60
(5th ed. 1984).
7. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); see also S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 § 7.05 (2d ed. 1986).
8. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
9. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967).
10. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
11. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
12. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
13. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
14. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
15. See Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir. 1988); Aitchison v.
Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943,
952-53 (7th Cir. 1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (1 1th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1039 (1983); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-50
(9th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193-94 (5th Cir. Unit A May
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir. 1980);
Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-14 (8th Cir. 1980). Before Lake
Country, however, some circuit court judges found city council members to have only qualified
legislative immunity under section 1983. See, e.g., Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958),
170
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This Comment concludes that the legislative function of city council
members should be qualifiedly, rather than absolutely, immune to sec-
tion 1983 damages. In reconciling section 1983 with the official immu-
nities doctrine, the Supreme Court has indicated that common law
tradition and public policy collectively determine what effect the stat-
ute has on any given class of public officials. Both of these factors,
contrary to circuit court reasoning, support qualified legislative immu-
nity for council members.
I. RECONCILING 42 U.S.C. § 1983 WITH COMMON LAW
OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES: WHERE DO CITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS STAND?
A. The Role of the City Council Member
City council members wield extensive governmental power over the
approximately 150 million Americans" who live in metropolitan
areas.17 Council members may, for example, enact zoning ordinances,
levy taxes, and control public education and city agencies. 18 If, pursu-
ant to governing, council members infringe upon persons' federal
rights, section 1983 may be the victims' only remedy.
. 42 U.S. C. § 1983: The Supreme Court's Interpretation
Congress passed section 1983 as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871,19 pursuant to the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amend-
abrogation recognized by Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1277; Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701,
706-07 (lst Cir. 1953) (Magruder, CJ., concurring).
16. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1990).
17. City council members serve on a city council, the body that governs a metropolitan area.
See C. RHYNE, THE LAW OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS 72 (1980). State statutes
create councils and give them power to govern. Id. There are five basic types of city councils:
the strong and weak mayor-council plans, the commission plan, the council-manager plan, and
the mayor-administrator plan. See Morlan, Local Governments-The Cities, in THE 50 STATES
AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 469-89 (J. Fesler ed. 1967). Under the strong mayor-
council plan, the mayor has substantive administrative authority and the council focuses on
legislative matters. Id at 473-74. The weak mayor-council plan has a mayor with formal duties
as chief executive, but the substantive legislative and administrative functions lie with the council
and various boards of elected and appointed officials. Id. at 469-73. With the commission form
of city government, a handful of commissioners holds all legislative and administrative authority;
the commissioners are usually, though not always, elected. Id. at 475-78. Under the council-
manager plan, all policy-making and administrative powers reside in an elected council which
usually appoints one of its members as mayor. Id. at 478-86. Under the mayor-administrator
plan, the mayor retains substantive administrative control of the city, but appoints a city
manager to help with responsibilities. Id. at 486-89.
18. 2 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10.01 (3d ed. 1988).
19. S. NAHMOD, supra note 7, § 1.03.
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ment. This Act, named the "Ku Klux Klan Act," attempted to stop
members of the Klan and corrupt southern governments from law-
lessly disenfranchising freed slaves and their allies. Schematically, sec-
tion 1983 inserted the federal government between a state and its
population in order to protect the citizens' fourteenth amendment
rights from unconstitutional government action. 20 On a practical
level, the statute provided victims with civil causes of actions against
all persons who under color of state law violated the victims' federally
protected rights.21
Notwithstanding the broad application of section 1983, the Supreme
Court has held that the statute does not abrogate "firmly established"
common-law immunities that reflect policies consistent with the stat-
ute's original purpose.22 In section 1983 cases, consequently, the
Court has adopted the common-law official immunities for numerous
classes of public officials at the state and local levels.23
C. Reconciling 42 U.S. C. § 1983 with the Official Immunities
Doctrine
There are two basic types of official immunity: qualified immunity,
and the more protective absolute immunity. 24 In the section 1983 con-
text, as well as at common law, these immunities differ in scope and
20. Id. (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 US 225, 238-39, 242 (1972)); see also Eisenberg,
Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 484
(1982).
21. See Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 484-85.
22. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637 (1980); see, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376-79 (1951). Although section 1983 does not abrogate common law principles
of immunity, the Supreme Court has amended these principles. At traditional common law, for
example, qualified immunity required the protected officials to act reasonably or without malice.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). In modem section 1983 cases, however, officials
with qualified immunity need only show that reasonable persons in the officials' positions would
not have known that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-42 (1987) (explaining qualified immunity as stated in Harlow); see
generally S. NAHMOD, supra note 7, §§ 8.01-.18 (background and analysis of qualified
immunity). Moreover, although governors had absolute immunity at common law, they are only
qualifiedly immune to section 1983 claims. Compare W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 132, at 987-88 (4th ed. 1971) (stating that absolute immunity extends to a state's
highest executive officers) with Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974) (holding that
governors are only qualifiedly immune to section 1983). For an analysis of Scheuer, see S.
NAHMOD, supra note 7, § 8.13. Finally, bi-state regional planners, a class of officials with no
common law heritage, have the same absolute immunity to section 1983 as state legislators. Lake
Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
23. See I C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS §§ 99-115 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp.
1988).
24. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 807-08.
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applicability. They also attach to official functions rather than to titu-
lar positions.2"
1. Qualified Immunity
Modem qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. It shields
defendant officials from civil damages if they can satisfy a two-part
test. First, the officials must show that they performed the allegedly
violative activity pursuant to their official duties. Second, the officials
must prove that reasonable persons in the officials' positions would not
have known that such conduct would violate the plaintiffs' clearly
established constitutional rights.26 The burden of proof is on the offi-
cials because they plead the immunity as a defense.
In section 1983 cases, the Supreme Court has amended the coverage
of qualified immunity. Traditionally, governors and high level state
executives were absolutely immune for their discretionary functions.27
In the modem section 1983 realm, governors and other public officials
have only qualified immunity for their executive, as well as administra-
tive, decisions.28 Such immunity reconciles two competing public
interests: citizens can vindicate important federal rights, and public
officials can perform their discretionary duties independently and
without fear of frivolous suits.29
2. Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, provides
a complete bar to civil liability for damages under section 1983. By
precluding damages liability altogether, absolute immunity eliminates
the need for public officials to prove that they acted reasonably.30
25. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); see S. NAHMOD, supra note 7, §§ 7.01, 8.01.
But see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744-57 (1982) (the President's special status under the
Constitution gives the President absolute immunity for all Presidential duties).
26. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-42 (1987); see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 7,
§§ 8.01-.18.
27. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 132, at 988 (stating that absolute immunity extends to a
state's highest executive officers).
28. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229-30 (administrative decisions of state court judges are qualifiedly
immune to section 1983); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238-49 (1974) (an executive decision
of a state governor is qualifiedly immune to section 1983). For analysis of Scheuer, see S.
NAHMOD, supra note 7, § 8.13.
29. Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)).
30. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976); see also S. NAHMOD, supra note 7.
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In section 1983 cases, the Supreme Court has extended absolute
damages immunity to state3 and regional32 legislative conduct,33 and
to the adjudicative conduct of judges34 and prosecutors. 35 The Court
bases such immunity on what the Court views as "well established"
common law principles of official immunity and public policy.3 6
In 1951, the Supreme Court first recognized absolute immunity to
section 1983 damages in Tenney v. Brandhove.37 In Tenney, the Court
adopted absolute immunity for state legislators who violate section
1983 when performing a legislative function.38
The Tenney decision relied on a two-step canon of construction.
First, the Court found that when Congress passed section 1983 in
1871, state legislators enjoyed absolute legislative immunity based on a
"tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England ... and carefully
preserved in [the United States]."39 Second, the Court found that the
31. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
32. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
33. Absolute legislative immunity differs from absolute judicial and prosecutorial immunity in
that absolute legislative immunity protects individual legislators against injunctive relief as well
as damages. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S.
719, 731-34 (1980). But see Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625, 634-35 (1990) (not ruling
out the possibility of contempt sanctions against individual city council members who do not
comply with an injunction against the council body). See also Schapiro, The Legislative
Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231, 234, 238-42
(1989) (arguing that a court order that enjoins a legislative body to pass specific legislation does
not controvert principles of legislative immunity).
34. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967).
35. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-27 (1975).
36. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1979).
37. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
38. See id. at 376, 379. A state legislator's function involves making state policy that
complies with the state and federal constitutions. See Mansfield, Functions of State and Local
Governments, in THE 50 STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 105-06 (J. Fesler ed. 1967);
see also Bosworth, Policy Making, in THE 50 STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, id. at
297-300. State policy can involve important national, state, and local issues, and such policy is
often enacted through state legislative procedures and codified in state constitutions and/or
statutes. Id.
39. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. Legislative immunity was first codified in the English Bill of
Rights in 1689. The immunity was then known as the "parliamentary privilege," and it was
based on separation of powers principles. See Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilege and
the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1122-35 (1973). Specifically, the privilege
allowed members of parliament to engage in free discourse on the House floor without fear of
reprisal from the King. Id. at 1122.
In America, the privilege was codified in the speech or debate clause of the Constitution, with
language borrowed from the English Bill of Rights. Id. at 1135-44. The privilege has evolved to
protect not only federal legislative speech, but the independence of the entire legislative function.
Id. at 1144. Although the clause immunizes only federal legislators, many state legislatures
incorporated the immunity into their state constitutions. See, e.g., Tenney, 341 U.S. at 375.
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statute's language and legislative history failed to indicate that Con-
gress intended to abrogate this immunity.'
In dicta, the Tenney court found that legislative immunity serves
the public good because such immunity allows courageous decision-
making by state legislators without precluding checks on, and reme-
dies for, official misconduct.41 Absolute legislative immunity enables
and encourages public representatives to firmly and effectively dis-
charge their public duty without fearing the resentment of aggrieved
members of the public.42 Such decisionmaking would be difficult if the
privilege were not absolute, the Court found, because legislators'
motives could be challenged and speculated upon in "cost[ly] and
inconvenien[t] and distract[ing]" jury trials.43 Moreover, elections
and legislative self-discipline, rather than litigation, provide more
appropriate checks against legislative misconduct.44 The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that public policy supports absolute immunity of
state legislative functions in section 1983 cases.
In 1967 and 1976, the Supreme Court extended absolute immunity
to judicial4" and prosecutorial' functions under section 1983. In both
cases, the Court formally complied with Tenney's canon of construc-
tion. The Court purported to find that these absolute immunities were
well established in common law47 and that there was no indication
that Congress intended to abrogate such immunity.4 These cases
reveal a common policy: anything less than absolute immunity for
judges and prosecutors undermines the adjudicative process by inter-
fering with the independent, principled and fearless decisions of these
participants.49 Furthermore, the appellate process is an adequate
means of remedying judicial misconduct.5"
40. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. For criticism of the Court's analysis, see Eisenberg, supra note
20, at 491-99. But see S. NAHMOD, supra note 7, § 7.02.
41. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78 (legislative self-discipline and voters, rather than the courts,
should discourage and correct official abuse of discretion).
42. Id at 373.
43. Id at 377.
44. Id at 378.
45. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
46. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
47. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421-24; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-55. The Pierson and Imbler courts
arguably did not sufficiently show that there were established common law rules of absolute
judicial and prosecutorial immunity, respectively, when section 1983 was passed. See, e.g., I C.
ANTIMEAU, supra note 23, §§ 99, 105; Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79
YALE L.J. 322, 328 (1969).
48. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-55.
49. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1983).
50. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
175
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In 1979, the Supreme Court extended absolute legislative immunity
to regional planners. In Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,5" the Court held that non-elected members of a bi-
state regional planning board were entitled to absolute immunity from
section 1983 when acting "in a capacity comparable to that of mem-
bers of a state legislature."52 The Court reasoned that Tenney's abso-
lute state legislative immunity rested on policy considerations5 3 that
applied equally to federal, state, and regional legislators,54 even if the
regional legislators were unelected." The Court did not discuss means
of checking or remedying the official misconduct of the regional
legislators.
3. The Circuit Courts' Rationale for Adopting Absolute Legislative
Immunity for City Council Members
After Lake Country, the question remained whether city council
members had absolute legislative immunity under section 1983. The
Lake Country court expressly declined to decide whether local, as
compared to state and regional, legislative functions were also entitled
to absolute immunity from section 1983 damages claims. 6 In the
aftermath of Lake Country, however, eight circuit courts of appeals
have adopted absolute immunity for local legislative functions. 7 The
Eighth Circuit5" and the Fourth Circuit59 set forth specific, independ-
ent legal rationales for such immunity.'
51. 440 U.S. 391, 402-06 (1979).
52. Id. at 406.
53. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951).
54." Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 405.
55. Id. at 404-05. For criticism of the court's reasoning, see Eisenberg, supra note 20, at
502-03.
56. Lake Country, 440 U.S. at 404 n.26. This Comment will refer to such immunity as
"absolute local legislative immunity."
57. See cases cited supra note 15. The circuits, however, disagree on how to properly identify
"legislative" conduct, which is considered absolutely immune, from executive or administrative
conduct, which are qualifiedly immune. The courts split three ways on this issue. Some circuits
find that official conduct is "legislative" if it involves discretion and policymaking that is
traditionally seen as part of the legislative function. See, e.g., Minton v. St. Bernard Parish
School Bd., 803 F.2d 129, 135 (5th Cir. 1986). Other circuits, however, look to see whether the
conduct establishes general policy, or singles out individuals for special treatment. See, e.g.,
Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259, 261 (1st Cir. 1984). The Third Circuit requires legislative
conduct to be "procedurally" as well as "substantively" legislative. See Ryan v. Burlington
County, N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1290-91 (3d Cir. 1989). See generally Schapiro, supra note 33, at
240-41; M. Schwartz, Legislative Immunity Developments, N.Y.L.J., Oct 18, 1988, at 3, col. 1.
58. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980).
59. Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 274-80 (4th Cir. 1980).
60. The Seventh Circuit has set forth further policy justifications for adopting absolute
legislative immunity. In Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir. 1983), the
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a. The Eighth Circuit: Balancing Public Interests
In Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky,6 1 the Eighth Circuit held
that city directors were absolutely legislatively immune to section 1983
claims when they conspired to enact an allegedly unconstitutional
amendment to the city's zoning ordinance. The Gorman court rea-
soned that the Supreme Court's official immunity decisions balance
policy interests. 2 On one side of the scale is the interest of having
official decisionmaking free from the fear of burdensome litigation.63
On the other side of the scale are the interests in deterring improper
official conduct and providing adequate remedies." According to the
Gorman court, this balancing test weighed in favor of absolute legisla-
tive immunity for the city directors.6"
The Eighth Circuit gave three reasons for adopting absolute legisla-
tive immunity for city council members. First, the public good is
served if local legislative decisionmaking is free of litigation.66 Local
legislators are particularly close to their constituents and are therefore
more vulnerable to lawsuits spurred by their legislative acts.67 Second,
personal liability for damages under section 1983 was not needed as a
check on the council members' unconstitutional conduct.68 The court
reasoned that criminal law, the electoral process, and judicial review
of unconstitutional zoning sufficiently restrain unconstitutional official
activity.69 Third, plaintiffs could obtain adequate remedies by suing
the city directly rather than the local legislators.70
court noted that such immunity was warranted even though fewer safeguards to official
misconduct exist at the local, as opposed to state and federal, level of government. In particular,
separation of powers, bureaucracy, political competition, and the press are more effective checks
on official misconduct at the state, as opposed to local, level. The court reasoned that weaker
safeguards should not diminish local legislative immunity, because no such safeguards operate
against judges, who have absolute immunity, and local government is less powerful than state
government. Reed, 704 F.2d at 953.
61. 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980). The city board was unicameral, having seven members who
exercised the city's executive and legislative authority without self-disciplinary provisions. Id. at
613.
62. Gorman, 626 F.2d at 612; see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
63. Gorman, 626 F.2d. at 612.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 613-14.
66. Id. at 612.
67. Id. at 612-14.
68. Id. at 613.
69. Id.
70. Id. Plaintiffs may sue municipalities under Section 1983. Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Moreover, cities have neither qualified nor absolute
immunity. Owen v. City of Indepedence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). But see Baker v. Mayor & City
Council, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 57 (1990). The Fourth Circuit
ruled that legislative immunity barred the plaintiff's age discrimination suit against the city. The
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b. The Fourth Circuit: The Functional Approach
In Bruce v. Riddle," the Fourth Circuit followed Gorman's lead and
held that individual county council members had absolute legislative
immunity to section 1983.72 Looking towards Supreme Court prece-
dent, the Bruce court found that Tenney grounded absolute state legis-
lative immunity to section 1983 on English and American common
law, neither of which offered any guidance on the immunity of local
legislators.7 3  Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit concluded that local
legislators were absolutely immune to section 1983 based on Supreme
Court precedent.74 The court reasoned that the Supreme Court had
extended absolute legislative immunity to regional legislators because
they function within a legislative sphere, and not because these officials
function at a particular level of government.75 The Fourth Circuit
concluded, therefore, that local legislators should be absolutely
immune when performing a legislative function.76
court reasoned that although legislative immunity protects legislators only in their individual
capacities, a suit against a local legislative body is precluded if it forces the legislators to reveal
aspects of their decision-making process. Id. at 681-82.
71. 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) (the council passed a rezoning ordinance prohibiting multi-
family dwellings, thereby greatly reducing the value of plaintiff's land; the plaintiff claimed that
the council members' decision was made in bad faith).
72. Id. at 274.
73. Id. at 276. The Fourth Circuit stated that the early American cases were "concerned for
the most part with types of qualified immunity." Id. Indeed, when section 1983 was passed, the
general common-law rule appeared to be that city council members had qualified immunity for
their discretionary acts. See, e.g., Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-07 (1st Cir. 1953)
(Magruder, C.J., concurring); Walker v. Hallock, 32 Ind. 239, 243-44 (1869) (city council
members are not individually liable in a civil suit for discretionary acts, unless such acts are
corrupt); Baker v. State, 27 Ind. 485, 488-89 (1867); 1 J. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS 298-99 n.2 (2d ed. 1873) (citing Walker and Baker); Annotation, Civil
Responsibility of Member of Legislative Body for His Vote Therein, 22 A.L.R. 125 (1923). But see
T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 376 (1879) (stating that city council members
have absolute legislative immunity). Cooley, however, supports local absolute legislative
immunity with a cite to Baker, a case supporting qualified immunity for city council members.
See Baker, 27 Ind. at 488-89.
74. Bruce, 631 F.2d at 279.
75. Id. at 277. In support of its conclusion, the appellate court noted that four Supreme
Court Justices acknowledged local absolute legislative immunity in a footnote in a dissenting
opinion. Id. at 279 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 664 n.6 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting)).
76. Bruce, 631 F.2d at 279.
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II. NO BASIS IN LAW OR POLICY FOR GIVING CITY
COUNCIL MEMBERS ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE
IMMUNITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Qualified legislative immunity should replace absolute legislative
immunity for city council members in section 1983 cases. The circuit
courts' adoption of absolute legislative immunity is incorrect because
it relies on reasoning that does not comport with standards set forth in
Supreme Court cases on section 1983 official immunity. The critical
issue in these cases is whether a specific type of official conduct war-
rants the extra protection of absolute immunity, rather than just quali-
fied immunity. In making this determination, the Supreme Court
follows the Tenney canon of construction by looking at legislative his-
tory and common law tradition.77 The Court also considers, as the
Eighth Circuit recognizes, public policy interests such as remedying
deprivations of important federal rights,78 checking official miscon-
duct,79 and the countervailing policy of encouraging fearless, effective
decisionmaking that serves the public good.80 Contrary to circuit
court findings, these considerations do not support absolute legislative
immunity for city council members.
A. Legal Analysis Supports Adopting Qualified Legislative Immunity
to City Council Members in Section 1983 Cases
The circuit courts base absolute legislative immunity of city council
members partly on incorrect legal analysis. The courts attach too
much precedential value to Tenney and Lake Country, two cases that
do not logically entail absolute legislative immunity at the local level.
Moreover, the courts do not adhere to Tenney's canon of
construction."1
77. See, ag., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-25 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
553-55 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-77 (1951).
78. See, ag., Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378; cf Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
79. See, e.g., Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421-25; Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
80. See, eg., Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377; cf Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814.
81. See, ag., Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980) (no
discussion of common law official immunity of city council members); see also Bruce v. Riddle,
631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980) (declining to follow common law).
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1. Tenney and Lake Country: No Precedential Support for Giving
City Council Members Absolute Legislative Immunity to
Section 1983
Tenney and Lake Country, contrary to circuit court findings,82 do
not support absolute immunity for local legislative activity.83 As
noted above,84 the Supreme Court adopts official immunity to section
1983 on a functional basis. In Tenney and Lake Country, the Court
immunized state legislative functions and comparable regional legisla-
tive functions respectively.85 The state legislative function, however, is
inherently different from the city legislative function.
The state legislative function is to make state policy in accordance
with the state and federal constitutions.86 State policy can involve
important national, state, and local issues. Such policy is often
enacted through state legislative procedures and codified in state con-
stitutions or statutes.87 Cities, on the other hand, are subordinate
"creatures of the state."88 City council members make policy regard-
ing only local matters, and the state controls the scope of this policy-
making power.89Moreover, there are different types of city govern-
ments: the strong and weak mayor-council plans, and the commission,
council-manager, and mayor-administrator plans.90 Most of these
plans do not resemble the separation-of-powers structure of state gov-
ernment. Furthermore, the scope of council members' legislative
function differs with each type of city government. 91
The circuit courts, therefore, incorrectly interpret Tenney and Lake
Country as precedent for absolute legislative immunity of city council
members in section 1983 cases. The state legislative function is simply
not analogous to the legislative function that city council members
perform in the various types of city governments. Rather than analo-
gizing city legislative functions to state legislative functions, the circuit
82. See, e.g., Bruce, 631 F.2d at 275-79; Gorman, 626 F.2d at 611-13.
83. See Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 503.
84. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988); see supra text accompanying note 25.
85. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 406
(1979); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
86. See Mansfield, supra note 38, at 105; see also Bosworth, supra note 38, at 297-300.
87. See Bosworth, supra note 38, at 298.
88. See Morlan, supra note 17, at 465-66.
89. See 2 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 18, § 10.09.
90. See Morlan, supra note 17, at 469.
91. See Morlan, supra note 17, at 469-89.
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courts should more carefully apply Tenney's canon of construction to
city council members. 92
2. Tenney' Canon of Construction: The Common Law Supports
Qualified Legislative Immunity for City Council Members
in Section 1983 Cases
Tenney's canon of construction, 93 which the Gorman and Bruce
courts did not follow,94 supports giving city council members qualified
immunity for their local legislative conduct that violates section 1983
because council members were not absolutely immune at common law
in 1871.95 The Tenney canon presumes that the "every person" lan-
guage of section 1983 was too broad to abrogate firmly established
common-law immunities. 96 Public officials, therefore, are generally
entitled to traditional common law immunities they had in 1871.
Under the Tenney Court's analysis, two aspects of traditional com-
mon law bear on section 1983's applicability to city council members:
the common law tradition of absolute legislative immunity in general,
and the traditional common law status of city council members in par-
ticular. Neither aspect supports absolute legislative immunity for city
council members.
a. General Principles of Absolute Legislative Immunity
General principles of absolute legislative immunity do not apply to
city council members because city governments are not generally
based on the separation-of-powers ideal. Absolute legislative immu-
nity is historically based on separation-of-powers principles. 97 The
immunity was originally intended to protect legislators' decisionmak-
ing from incursions by the executive branch. There are several differ-
ent types of city governments, however, and most are not based on the
92. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951). The Lake Country court could not
follow the Tenney court's canon of construction, because there is apparently no common law
tradition surrounding bi-state regional planners.
93. See id.
94. See Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 275-79 (4th Cir. 1980); Gorman Towers, Inc., v.
Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-13 (8th Cir. 1980).
95. See sources cited supra note 73; see also infra text accompanying notes 101-02.
96. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376. For a summary of the legislative debates on the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, see 1 B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS
597-653 (1970) (containing no discussion of section 1983's applicability to city council
members).
97. See Reinstein & Silvergate, supra note 39, at 1122-35.
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separation-of-powers principle.9" Therefore, the historical justification
for absolute legislative immunity does not apply to many city council
members.
b. The Common Law Status of City Council Members in 1871
According to the Tenney canon of construction, city council mem-
bers should be only qualifiedly immune to section 1983, because coun-
cil members had only a qualified immunity to individual civil liability
in 1871. 99 The Tenney Court found that in 1871 Congress did not
intend section 1983 to abrogate firmly established common law official
immunities." It is clear that in 1871, local absolute legislative immu-
nity was not well established at common law. The rule appears to
have been that city council members were individually immune to civil
liability for their official, discretionary acts only if such acts were not
corrupt."10 This is substantively the same as the traditional qualified
immunity."'o Because legislative decisions are discretionary acts, such
decisions were presumably also qualifiedly immune to civil liability.
According to the Tenney Court's canon of construction, this common-
law rule of qualified immunity should be preserved under section 1983.
c. The Common Law After 1871
The common law status of city council members after 1871 also
supports giving these officials qualified, rather than absolute, legisla-
tive immunity to section 1983. Although, according to Tenney's can-
non of construction, the 1871 common law rule of qualified immunity
of city council members would seem sufficient by itself to preclude
absolute immunity for local legislators in section 1983 cases, the
Supreme Court's adoption of judicial immunity 3 indicates otherwise.
For example, the Court made judges absolutely immune to section
1983 even though such immunity was arguably a minority rule at
common law when Congress passed the statute. ° In maintaining
that absolute judicial immunity was the rule as of 1871, the Court
98. See, e.g., Morlan, supra note 17, at 469-89. Furthermore, section 1983 provides a civil
cause of action to private citizens; it does not provide the executive branch with a criminal cause
of action against legislators.
99. See Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 704-05 (Ist Cir. 1953) (Magruder, C.J.,
concurring).
100. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376; see supra text accompanying note 40.
101. See sources cited supra note 73.
102. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982); supra note 22.
103. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
104, See supra note 47.
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relied on post-1871 case law and policy considerations.105 Supreme
Court precedent, therefore, requires an examination of the common
law status of city council members from 1871 to the present.
Since the passage of section 1983, the common law has continued to
support the adoption of qualified legislative immunity for city council
members in section 1983 actions. Over the last century, the majority
rule appears to have been that city council members have enjoyed only
qualified immunity for defamation during council debates. 106 The der-
ogation of someone's federally protected right is as serious as the dero-
gation of that person's reputation. If council members are liable for
their bad faith or unreasonable legislative conduct when it defames
someone, then council members should also be liable when such con-
duct violates a person's clearly established constitutional right. Post-
1871 common law, therefore, supports adopting qualified legislative
immunity for city council members in section 1983 cases.
B. Policy Considerations: Additional Support for Qualified
Legislative Immunity for City Council Members
In addition to common law tradition, public policy supports adopt-
ing qualified legislative immunity for city council members in section
1983 cases. Public policy is an important element in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of official immunity and section 1983.107 When
distinguishing between absolute and qualified immunity, the Court
tries to balance the interest of having independent, courageous deci-
sionmaking on the one hand, against the interests of remedying consti-
tutional deprivations and checking official misconduct on the other.10 8
In this regard, there are five relevant issues. First, will the fear of civil
liability hamper official decisionmaking that should be unfettered?109
Second, are there alternative paths to remedies?110 Third, will section
105. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 553-54.
106. See Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-07 (Ist. Cir. 1953) (Magruder, C.J.,
concurring); W. PAGE KEETON, supra note 6, § 114, at 820-21; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in
Defamation: Legislative and Executive Proceedings, 10 COLUM. L. Rav. 131, 137 (1910) (policy
considerations supporting absolute immunity to defamation at the state level are inapplicable at
the local level); cf Annotation, supra note 73 (discussing city council member's liability for his or
her vote).
107. See, eg., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367,
377-78 (1951). In Scheuer, policy concerns were arguably the sole basis of the Court's decision
to adopt only a qualified immunity for high-level state officials in section 1983 cases, because
such officials were absolutely immune at common law. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22.
108. See Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 612-13 (8th Cir. 1980).
109. See, eg., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976); Pierson, 386 U.S. 547, 554
(1967).
110. See, e.g., Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378.
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1983 litigation interfere with the officials' exercise of public duties?.11
Fourth, is section 1983 needed as a safeguard against officials' abuse of
discretion?' 12 Finally, will potential section 1983 liability deter quali-
fied persons from seeking public office?11 Circuit courts of appeals
have generally found that these policy issues favor absolute, rather
than qualified, immunity for local legislative activity.114 When scruti-
nized in light of the true nature of city government and current section
1983 opinions, however, these factors actually weigh against absolute
immunity and support qualified immunity.
1. Protecting a Council Member's Independent Decisionmaking
The independence of city council members' discretionary functions
does not warrant absolute immunity. Courts fear that the possibility
of defending against section 1983 lawsuits will deter local legislators
from making courageous, independent decisions because these officials
are close to their constituents and therefore more vulnerable to law-
suits. 15 Supreme Court precedent and state law, however, imply that
city council members' discretionary decisions do not warrant absolute
immunity. As noted above, the decisionmaking of high level execu-
tives, including governors, is only qualifiedly immune to suits under
section 1983.116 It is inconsistent to argue that the need for coura-
geous legislative decisionmaking of city council members warrants
absolute immunity when the decisionmaking of state governors is only
qualifiedly immune.
Additionally, a city council member's discretion is less independent
than state legislators' discretion because the former are subject to the
latters' control. The state legislature controls the boundaries of official
discretion in city government, and council members have discretion-
ary power only to the degree that the state allows.1 17 State control of
city council members' discretion, as well as the qualified immunity of
governors, controvert the argument that the independence of city
council members' discretion warrants absolute legislative immunity.
I11. Id. at 377.
112. See, e.g., id. at 378.
113. See, e.g., Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1292 (3d. Cir. 1989).
114. See, e.g., Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir. 1983); Gorman
Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 612-14 (8th Cir. 1980).
115. See, e.g., Gorman, 626 F.2d at 612.
116. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248 (1974). Moreover, governors are the chief
legislators in many states. Bosworth, supra note 38, at 312.
117. See 2 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 18, § 10.09.
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2. Remedying Deprivations of Constitutional Rights
City council members should not have absolute legislative immunity
because such immunity may preclude alternative remedies for viola-
tions of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court states that damages
suits against individual officials are important remedies for constitu-
tional deprivations.11 Absolute legislative immunity to section 1983,
however, bars injunctive and monetary relief against protected
officials. 119
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit 20 justifies absolute legislative
immunity of city council members by finding that plaintiffs have an
alternative means of vindicating their rights: they may sue the city.12 1
A recent Fourth Circuit decision, however, casts doubt on the Eighth
Circuit's position.1 22
In 1990, the Fourth Circuit prohibited an age discrimination suit
against a city council because the suit would have forced the council
members, who were protected by absolute legislative immunity, to
reveal aspects of their decision-making process; absolute legislative
immunity, the court found, precludes this type of revelation. 23 The
Fourth Circuit's reasoning would also preclude section 1983 actions
against city councils when such actions are dependent on council
members testifying about their legislative decisionmaking. Absolute
legislative immunity for city council members, therefore, could pre-
vent section 1983 plaintiffs from vindicating their federally protected
rights.
3. Distracting Litigation
Courts have expressed concern that section 1983 liability could lead
to litigation that would distract officials from their duties. 4 Modern
qualified immunity, rather than absolute immunity, offers a better
guard against distracting trials. First, the Court has reformulated
qualified immunity to focus primarily on an objective "reasonable per-
son" test. This test permits courts to resolve suits against public offi-
118. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 809 (1982).
119. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. 446 U.S. 719, 731-34
(8th Cir. 1980). But see sources cited supra note 33.
120. Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613 (1980).
121. It; see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Monell v. Dep't of
Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
122. Baker v. Mayor & City Council, 894 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 56
(1990).
123. Id.
124. See, eg., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Gorman, 626 F.2d at 612.
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cials at the summary judgment level.125 Second, qualified local
legislative immunity would help standardize the administration of jus-
tice. Courts that have adopted absolute local legislative immunity
have the difficult task of distinguishing between council members' leg-
islative activity, which the courts consider absolutely immune, and
nonlegislative activity, which is generally qualifiedly immune. 126 This
problem would be alleviated if local legislative activity was made qual-
ifiedly immune. Under such a rule, city council members would be
qualifiedly immune for all of their official conduct, be it legislative or
nonlegislative.
4. Safeguarding Against Abuses of Discretion
City council members should have only qualified legislative immu-
nity to section 1983 because some liability is needed as a safeguard
against council members' abuse of discretion. In Tenney, the Supreme
Court's adoption of absolute legislative immunity precluded section
1983's effectiveness as a safeguard against state legislators' abuse of
discretion. According to the Court, the ballot box and the legislature's
internal self-disciplinary procedures offered sufficient protection. 127
Internal self-disciplinary procedures and ballot boxes are insufficient
safeguards against city council members' abuse of discretion. Most
importantly, city governments have been historically prone to corrup-
tion, especially during elections.'28 Furthermore, as noted above, 129
the Seventh Circuit recognized that bureaucracy, political competi-
tion, the press, and separation of powers, though capable of preventing
official misconduct at the state level of government, do less to curtail
misconduct at the local level.' 3 Despite acknowledging weaker safe-
guards against local legislative misconduct, however, the Seventh Cir-
cuit gave local council members absolute legislative immunity.13 '
Reasoning by analogy, the court compared the diminished safeguards
against local legislative conduct to the weakened safeguards against
125. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 800, 815, 818 (1982).
126. See supra note 57.
127. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78.
128. See 1 J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 608-11 (1889).
129. See supra note 60.
130. Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 953 (7th Cir. 1983). Political competition
is less on the local level, for example, because many city council elections are nonpartisan. See
Morlan, supra note 17, at 504. Moreover, the checks and balances function of the separation of
powers principle is not prevalent in city government, and council members have extensive
administrative functions which presumably help them overcome bureaucratic resistance to their
legislative activity. See Morlan, supra note 17, at 469-89.
131. Reed, 704 F.2d at 953.
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judicial misconduct, noting that judicial conduct is absolutely immune
to section 1983.132 Absolute judicial immunity, however, does not
support absolute legislative immunity for city council members.
Unlike most city councils, the judicial process has built-in safeguards
against official misconduct. When a judge violates a person's federally
protected rights, civil and criminal rules of procedure grant or provide
the victim with standing to seek recourse through an appeal. More-
over, judicial misconduct is presumably curbed because the victim's
lawyer is normally present and obligated to zealously defend the rights
of his or her client. Local legislative activity, on the other hand, does
not offer the protections of the judicial process. Local legislatures gen-
erally provide no procedure for appealing the bad faith conduct of
their members. Furthermore, legislative misconduct does not ordina-
rily occur in a crowded courtroom in front of the victim's lawyer.
Consequently, the risk of misconduct by city council members is
greater than the risk of misconduct by judges. This greater risk, how-
ever, can be checked by qualified legislative immunity, which, unlike
absolute legislative immunity, would make council members person-
ally liable for their legislative misconduct. Qualified immunity, there-
fore, is an appropriate safeguard against local legislative misconduct.
5. Encouraging Qualified Persons to Run for City Council
Courts have expressed concern that qualified persons will not run
for local council positions if they risk being sued for their legislative
decisions.133 There are two reasons, however, that this concern does
not justify absolute legislative immunity for city council members.
First, under the reasonable person standard of modem qualified
immunity, officials are likely to win meritless suits at summary judg-
ment. 134 Second, the majority of city council members in American
cities today are responsible for their cities' administrative functions, 135
for which the council members have only a qualified immunity to sec-
132. Id. The court also found that stronger safeguards were unnecessary because local
government is weaker than state government. Id. This reasoning, however, is unrealistic
considering the array of powers that city council members wield over city residents. See supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
133. See, eg., Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1293 (3d Cir. 1989).
134. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, 818 (1982). Summary judgment motions still
cost time and money to defend, but the victor in section 1983 suits can recover attorney's fees.
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); see S. NAHMOD, supra
note 7, § 1.19.
135. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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tion 1983.136 Absolute legislative immunity, therefore, cannot offer
liability-free work to potential candidates for city councils.
III. CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt qualified legislative immunity for city council
members in section 1983 cases because Supreme Court precedent sup-
ports such immunity. When reconciling section 1983 with the official
immunities doctrine, the Supreme Court has adopted well established
common law immunities that are supported by public policy. The cir-
cuit courts, on the other hand, have neglected traditional common law
and misconstrued public policy.
Traditional common law supports qualified legislative immunity for
city council members. Before Congress passed section 1983, the com-
mon law gave city council members qualified immunity for their dis-
cretionary acts. Moreover, throughout the twentieth century council
members have been only qualifiedly immune for defamation. Qualified
immunity, therefore, has been the traditional common law standard
with respect to city council members.
Public policy likewise supports adopting qualified legislative immu-
nity for several reasons. Qualified legislative immunity is needed to
help vindicate federally protected rights and check official misconduct.
Moreover, council members' discretion is not independent enough to
warrant the complete protection of absolute immunity. Also, as cur-
rently applied on the local level, absolute legislative immunity does not
avoid time-consuming litigation. Finally, absolute legislative immu-
nity would not help encourage qualified persons to run for city coun-
cil, because council members have non-legislative responsibilities that
are only qualifiedly immune. Qualified legislative immunity for city
council members, therefore, is the correct rule in section 1983 cases.
Kevin R. Cole
136. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229-30 (1988).
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